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ILAN GOLDFAJN and POONAM GUPTA*
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the
exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It analyzes a large dataset of
currency crises in 80 countries for the period 1980–98. The main question
addressed is whether monetary policy can increase the probability of reversing a
postcrisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher infla-
tion. We find that tight monetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency under-
valuation through nominal appreciation. When the economy also faces a banking
crisis, the results are not robust and depend on the specification. [JEL E44, E63]
Tight money in a given financial crisis can serve either to attract funds or to repel
them, depending on the expectations that a rise in interest rates generates. With
inelastic expectations, no fear of crisis or of currency depreciation, an increase in
the discount rate attracts funds from abroad, and helps provide the cash needed to
ensure liquidity; with elastic expectations of change—of falling prices, bankrupt-
cies, or exchange depreciation—raising the discount rate may suggest to foreign-
ers the need to take more funds out rather than in.
—Charles P. Kindleberger (1978)
I
n the aftermath of currency crises, several economies have seen their exchange
rates depreciate beyond what could be justified by fundamentals. Recent exam-
ples of this overshooting include Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during the Asian
crisis in 1997 and Brazil in 1999. In this situation, policymakers have to decide
whether to tighten policies to stabilize the exchange rate and, in particular, whether
higher interest rates are the appropriate response. There is a lively debate in the
literature about whether tighter monetary policy is effective in these situations.
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Bank of Chile, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, George Washington University,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association con-
ference held in Buenos Aires in 1998. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) provide a very comprehensive discussion of the vari-
ous channels through which high interest rates may affect the exchange rate.1
This study attempts to shed light on this debate by analyzing a large set of
large depreciations in the aftermath of currency crises in the period 1980 to 1998.
The analysis of the effect of tight monetary policy on the exchange rate involves
three important steps. The first step is to evaluate whether the exchange rate over-
shot during the crisis or, in other words, whether the real exchange rate (RER) has
become undervalued and needs to be brought back to equilibrium. The second step
is to identify the mechanisms through which the RER could be corrected in case
it is undervalued. 
There are two ways to reverse an undervaluation: through nominal currency
appreciation or through higher inflation at home than abroad (or it can be reversed
through a combination of the two). If avoiding an inflation buildup is an important
concern and/or a nominal appreciation is desirable for the benefit of the domestic
corporate sector and banking sector balance sheets, the extent to which the reversals
occur through nominal appreciations is fundamental. The third step is to identify the
policies and the circumstances under which the reversal occurs through nominal
appreciation. In particular, it is important to evaluate whether nominal appreciations
occur mainly when interest rates are kept high. In addition, it is also important to
evaluate whether other economic conditions—for example, the state of the banking
system—influence the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. 
Operationally, the paper selects currency crises that have led to large under-
valuations of the real exchange rate and investigates the way the reversals have
occurred. It defines as successful cases reversals that occur primarily through
nominal appreciations rather than through higher inflation and calculates the
probability of successful cases in the overall sample.2 The paper calculates the
probability that a tight monetary policy—defined as being in effect when, in the
aftermath of the crisis, real interest rates are higher than the average real interest
rate during the 24 months preceding the crisis—is successful and compares it
with the overall probability of success. The traditional approach would suggest
that the probability of being successful is higher in cases where a tight monetary
policy is implemented. Then, the whole exercise is replicated using only twin cri-
sis cases in which currency crises coincided with banking crises. In principle, one
would expect tight monetary policies to be less successful when a country was
also experiencing a banking crisis.
The results indicate that tight monetary policy substantially increases the
probability of success. For example, for undervaluations greater than 15 percent,
the probability of success increases from 27 percent to 44 percent when tight mon-
etary policy is implemented; and for undervaluations greater than 20 percent, the
probability of success doubles, increasing from 25 percent to 50 percent. When
both currency and banking crises are present, the probability of a successful rever-
sal is not significantly higher.
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1See also Flood and Jeanne (2000), Krugman (1998a and b), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Stiglitz
(1998).
2Although it may be interesting to decompose the reversal in the RER to distinguish between home
and foreign inflation, this is beyond the scope of the present study.The exercise carried out in this study differs from previous studies in a few
important respects. First, it analyzes the relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates in crisis episodes, which are crucial periods for policymakers. This
leaves out several interesting issues but allows the study to concentrate on the role
of monetary policy in reestablishing currency stability after a large collapse.
Previous studies have looked at the general relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates, but few studies have concentrated their analysis on crisis episodes.
Second, this study examines a large set of currency crises and, therefore, can offer
more general results. Previous studies have concentrated on specific currency cri-
sis cases, offering more limited results.3 The availability of a sufficient quantity of
monthly data from the pooling of countries allows this study to refrain from
extracting the relevant information from more “noisy” daily data. Third, the paper
studies the relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates using
monthly data as opposed to studying the relationship between the respective nom-
inal variables. In addition, the objective of this study is to evaluate the relationship
between tight monetary policy and currency stabilization: both, in our view, are
more precisely defined using real rather than nominal variables. Finally, the recent
research and availability of data on banking crises allows us to evaluate the rela-
tionship between real interest rates and real exchange rates in cases where cur-
rency and banking crises occur simultaneously.
One caveat is that since the endogeneity issue is not addressed satisfactorily in
the analysis, the results can probably be interpreted as implying correlation rather
than causation. A typical endogeneity argument advanced is that interest rates and
exchange rates are both driven by the deterioration in investors’ confidence during
the crisis. The latter increases the risk premium and, consequently, interest rates and,
at the same time, depresses the exchange rate. This would, however, typically gen-
erate a negative correlation rather than the positive correlation obtained in our study.
The study also does not analyze the role of high interest rates in preventing a
currency crisis, since the focus is on the role of interest rates in reversing under-
valuation following a currency crisis.4 The former issue is analyzed in a contem-
porary paper by Kraay (1998). Interestingly, Kraay finds no evidence that “(a)
interest rates set by the monetary authority systematically increase during specu-
lative attacks that do not culminate in the devaluation of the currency, or (b)
increases in these interest rates lower the probability that a speculative attack cul-
minates in the devaluation of the currency.”5
In order to take into account the costs involved in raising interest rates and
weigh them against the benefits, the study looks at the effect of tight monetary pol-
icy on output growth, inflation, the current account, and debt servicing. It finds
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3For example, the Asian crises and the debate on the role of monetary policy have motivated a few
studies to analyze the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates in the five or six most affected
countries. See Ghosh and Phillips (1998), Baig and Goldfajn (2002), and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1998).
4Though interesting, this issue is beyond the scope of our study.
5Kraay’s paper, however, uses central bank discount rates to measure the tightness of monetary pol-
icy. It is well known that discount rates tend to remain flat and often do not reflect short-run monetary
policies. (For example, Sweden’s famous 500 percent interest rate defense in September 1992 was not
reflected in the discount rate, which remained constant.)that the recovery of output is steeper, inflation declines more sharply, and the cur-
rent account improves when monetary policy is tight than when it is not.
This study is organized as follows. Section I explains the methodology and the
data used. Section II characterizes the undervaluation cases by looking at their
duration and frequency. Section III characterizes the reversals and evaluates the
effect of monetary policy, providing the essential results in the paper. Section IV
analyzes the behavior of important macroeconomic variables in currency crises,
with and without tight monetary policy. Section V presents the econometric anal-
ysis, and Section VI concludes.
I. Methodology and Data
This paper analyzes all the episodes of currency collapses that resulted in large
undervaluations from a sample of 80 countries between January 1980 and January
1998 and studies the role of tight monetary policy in reversing undervaluations
through nominal appreciation of the currencies rather than through higher inflation.
This exercise requires the definition of four different objects. First, one needs to
define the term “undervaluation” and specify the threshold that defines a “large”
undervaluation. Second, one needs to define what constitutes a successful
reversal—that is, it requires a threshold for the proportion of the reversal to equi-
librium that is due to nominal appreciation of the currency. (For example, is a rever-
sal that is 50 percent driven by nominal exchange appreciation a successful case?)
Third, one needs to define tight monetary policy and, finally, to specify how to eval-
uate whether tight monetary policy has helped stabilize the exchange rate. 
Definition of Undervaluation
This study defines undervaluation episodes as departures of the actual real
exchange rate from an estimated equilibrium real exchange rate. Specifically,
undervaluations are defined as deviations of the actual exchange rate from a
Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. The filtered series captures stochastic trends in
the series and allows us to concentrate on the cyclical behavior of potentially non-
stationary RER series. It represents the predicted equilibrium RER and captures
the permanent changes in relative prices between countries, while the estimated
undervaluation series represents the cyclical component of the RER movement
since, as a misalignment, it must eventually correct itself. This approach will also
net out from the undervaluation measure trends in the equilibrium RER, such as
the Balassa-Samuelson effect.6
The study also defines the equilibrium real exchange rate as the predicted
value of the cointegrating regression between the actual real exchange rate and a
set of fundamentals, including the terms of trade, openness, government size, and
international interest rate, and calculates the undervaluations as deviations from
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6The Balassa-Samuelson effect occurs when a country’s productivity in the tradable sector grows faster
than those of its trading partners and this differential growth is smaller in the nontradable sector. Then the
(cross-country) relative price of nontradables increases and, therefore, the RER appreciates over time.Ilan Goldfajn and Poonam Gupta
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this equilibrium value (see Goldfajn and Valdés, 1998). In the study, we will use
RER series to test for robustness of the results.
Figure 1 presents the definition of an undervaluation episode and its phases. We
define the start of an undervaluation case as the time when the difference between
the actual RER and our estimate of the steady-state RER is equal to or higher than
a certain threshold (for example, 15 percent or 25 percent). The undervaluation ends
when this difference hits a second threshold associated with the existence of no
undervaluation. We define this second threshold as 5 percent. In order to control for
data blips, an episode has to be sustained for more than two consecutive months.
We  define four notable points: (i) start, when the undervaluation hits the
threshold; (ii) end, when the undervaluation disappears—that is, the RER hits the
5 percent benchmark; (iii) peak, when the undervaluation is the highest; and (iv)
history, when the undervaluation first reaches 5 percent. An undervaluation
episode is then defined as the start-end period. There are also two phases: history-
peak, representing the buildup of the overshooting, and peak-end, representing the
reversal to a “normal” level.
Definition of Successful Reversals
There are two ways to reverse an undervaluation: through nominal currency appre-
ciation or through higher inflation at home than abroad (or a combination of the two).
If avoiding an inflation buildup is an important concern and/or nominal appreciation
is desirable for the benefit of domestic corporate balance sheets, the extent to which
the reversals occur through nominal appreciations is of fundamental importance. 
In order to decompose the real appreciation that occurs during the return to
equilibrium, we calculate the total appreciation of the actual real exchange rate dur-
ing the peak-end phase and the total nominal appreciation during that same period.
Successful reversals can then be defined as episodes that return to equilibrium with
higher than a specified threshold of nominal appreciation of the currency.
Letting ∆ denote percentage change, we have the identity:
∆ RER ≡∆ E+∆ (P–P*) (1)
where E and RER are the nominal and real effective exchange rate indices, respec-
tively, and P and P* the price indices at home and abroad, respectively. We can
then calculate
S=∆ E/∆ RER (2)
as our success index. As a starting point, we define a successful case as occurring
when the success index S is greater than 50 percent. We also test the sensitivity of
our results to different thresholds for S.
Definition of Tight Monetary Policy
Ideally, one would like to have exogenous shocks to monetary policy in all the cri-
sis episodes. Clearly, there are no such data available. This study identifies a coun-
try as experiencing a tight monetary policy when the average real interest rate duringthe period of undervaluation, r,e xceeds a threshold real interest rate. The latter is
calculated as the average real interest rate during the 24 months preceding the crises,
µr,p l u s x times the standard deviation of the series, σ r—that is,
r > µr + xσ r. (3)
As a starting point, we have set x equal to zero in the benchmark case but perform
sensitivity analysis.
There are several possible ways to calculate real interest rates, depending on
how expected inflation is proxied.7 In this study, we calculate expected inflation by
taking the following month’s inflation. The real interest rate in period t is then cal-
culated by taking the quarterly moving average of real interest rates, centered at t.
The study evaluates the results under different definitions of the real interest
rate and tightness definitions.
How to Determine Whether Tight Monetary Policy Has Been Effective
The study defines monetary policy as having been effective if the conditional
probability of reversing an undervaluation through nominal appreciations using
tight monetary policy is significantly higher than the unconditional probability 
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Figure 1. Definition of Cases and Phases(or higher than the probability of reversing the undervaluation by not using tight
policy). In other words, we consider that monetary policy has been effective if in
instances where countries had tight monetary policies, we observe a significantly
larger proportion of success in reversing an undervaluation than that observed in
the overall sample.
The main tables in the study compare the conditional probabilities of success
under tight or non-tight monetary policies for different thresholds and definitions.
In particular, we will evaluate the probability of success of tight monetary policy
with and without a banking crisis.
Data Description
Our sample consists of monthly data for 80 countries. (See Appendix I for a list of the
countries in the sample during the period January 1980 to January 1998.8) The
monthly data on nominal interest rates were obtained from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS). For nominal interest rates, we used the series for money
market rates and treasury bill rates. In a few cases where none of the above-mentioned
series were available, the series for deposit rates or discount rates was used.
The data on seasonally adjusted consumer price indices (CPIs), nominal effec-
tive exchange rates, and real effective exchange rates were obtained from the IMF’s
Information Notice System (INS).9 The use of the INS effective real exchange rate
should, in principle, consider the effect of competitive devaluations in third mar-
kets. The existence of banking crises is summarized by a dummy series. The dates
of banking crises have been obtained from Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996);
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996); and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Since
these studies provide only annual data, monthly data were interpolated by assum-
ing that the crisis lasted from January of the year in which it started until December
of the year in which it ended. 
II. Characterizing Undervaluation During Crises
In this section, we present several characteristics of the undervaluation episodes in
our sample. In particular, we analyze the number of episodes with different mag-
nitudes of undervaluation, the average duration of the undervaluation episodes, the
proportion of cases in which banking problems were also experienced (that is, of
twin-crises cases), and the proportion of cases in which monetary policy was tight.
Number of Cases 
The number of episodes clearly depends on the cutoff that defines undervaluation.
We identified 77 cases of undervaluation using a 15 percent cutoff—that is, there
are 77 cases in our sample where the real exchange rate has overshot by at least
Ilan Goldfajn and Poonam Gupta
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8We started with the same set of 93 countries as included in Goldfajn and Valdés (1998); because of
the unavailability of the data, however, some countries had to be dropped, and the final sample consisted
of 80 countries.
9The nominal and real exchange rates have been defined such that an increase is an appreciation. 15 percent. As we make the definition stricter by raising the cutoff, the number of
undervaluation cases declines. Thus, while the number of cases with more than a
20 percent undervaluation declines to 57, there are just 36 cases in which the real
exchange rate is found to be undervalued by more than 30 percent. These results
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 also shows the proportion of banking crises in the sample. We identi-
fied about 36–45 percent of the undervaluation cases to be twin-crises cases—that
is, we have found that about one-third to nearly one-half of the undervaluation
cases are accompanied by a fragile banking sector.10 This confirms previous
results in the literature that find strong evidence for the simultaneous occurrence
of banking and currency crises. 
We find monetary policy to be tight in nearly one-quarter of the cases with
more than 10 percent undervaluation. The percentage of such cases declines when
the threshold used to define undervaluation is increased.
Duration of Undervaluations
We also examined the average duration for which the real exchange rate remained
undervalued after a currency crisis. The average duration of the undervaluation
was found to be about 27 months for the cases with more than a 15 percent under-
valuation. The average buildup phase—that is, the history-peak phase—is 7.2
months, which is considerably shorter than the phase of reversal—that is, the
peak-end phase—about 20 months. These results are summarized in Table 2. We
compare the duration of cases with tight and non-tight monetary policies and find
that the former cases are more prolonged.
We also present a frequency histogram of the duration of the buildup phase and
the reversal phase in Figure 2. As can be seen from the figure, there is a great asym-
metry in the duration of these two phases. On the one hand, in more than 65 percent
DOES MONETARY POLICY STABILIZE THE EXCHANGE RATE?
97
Table 1. Number of Undervaluation Episodes
Proportion Proportion 
Undervaluation1 Number  of Cases with  of Cases with 
(percent) of Crises Tight Policy2 Banking Crises3
15 77 23.4 45.5
20 57 24.6 47.4
25 47 23.4 44.7
30 36 19.4 47.2
35 22 9.1 36.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Misalignment with respect to constructed real exchange rate equilibrium. 
2Tight policy is defined as a real interest rate larger than the average for the previous 24 months.
3Banking crises dummy as in Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996).
10See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for evidence on the existence of twin crises and various expla-
nations of why such crises may arise. of the cases the buildup takes only one to three months, and in almost 80 percent of
the cases it takes less than one year. On the other hand, the reversal takes much
longer: in only 30 percent of the cases does reversal take less than one year. 
III. Characterizing Reversals and the Effect of Monetary Policy
In this section, we address the main questions raised in this paper. What is the
probability that a reversal occurs through nominal appreciation rather than through
higher inflation? What is the effect of a tight monetary policy on the probability
of successful reversals? Does the condition of the banking system alter the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy?
We first analyze the proportion of successful cases. Then we identify the pro-
portion of successes in cases where interest rates were kept high. In light of the
recent debate on how the state of the banking system may influence the relation-
ship between interest and exchange rates, we analyze the effect of the health of the
banking sector on the probability of a successful reversal. 
Unconditional Reversals: Proportion of Nominal Appreciation
Versus Inflationary Returns
In Figure 3 we present the probability of reversal through nominal appreciation
for varying degrees of undervaluation. We define successful cases as the ones in
which nominal appreciation of the exchange rate is responsible for at least 50 per-
cent of the reversal in the real exchange rate. We found that in a significant
number of cases, the reversal comes through a nominal appreciation of the
currency—for example, 31 percent of the undervaluation cases of more than
15 percent were found to be successes. The percentage of successful cases
declines, but not significantly, for undervaluations of higher magnitudes. Thus,
about 25 percent of the undervaluations of greater than 30 percent were reversed
through nominal appreciations. This implies that the magnitude of the overshoot-
ing does not significantly affect the probability of reversing the undervaluation
through nominal appreciations. 
Ilan Goldfajn and Poonam Gupta
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Phase Months Monetary Policy) Monetary Policy)
Buildup 7.2 11.2 6.0
Reversal 19.9 29.6 16.9
Total 27.1 40.8 22.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Total episode is defined as extending from history to end, buildup from history to peak, and


















































































Figure 2. Phases Duration Histogram
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Figure 3. Probability of Reversing Undervaluations Through Nominal Appreciations
Figure 3. Probability of Reversing Undervaluations Through Nominal Appreciations
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Conditional Reversals: Proportion of Successful Cases 
with Tight Monetary Policy
Table 3 and Figure 4 address one of the main questions of the paper, which is what
effect tight monetary policy has on bringing the reversal through nominal appre-
ciation. The probability of success conditional on using tight monetary policy is
substantially higher than the probability of success conditional on non-tight pol-
icy. Thus, while the probability of success is only 27 percent for an undervaluation
of at least 15 percent for cases with non-tight monetary policy, the probability
increases to 44 percent for cases with tight monetary policy. This result is con-
firmed for all the different degrees of undervaluation. For different thresholds of
undervaluations, we find the probability of successful reversals to be significantly
higher for tight monetary policy at significance levels of 85 percent or higher. The
test statistic used is chi-square. (See Appendix II for details.)
Thus, the results could lend support to the use of tight monetary policy to cor-
rect an undervaluation of the currency. One has to interpret the results with cau-
tion, however. Since there is no truly exogenous policy variable in this exercise,
the higher incidence of successes under high real interest rates could be due to the
effect of a third factor.
Notwithstanding this caveat, the fact that our results show a positive correla-
tion between tight monetary policies and nominal appreciations is interesting. A
typical “endogeneity” argument advanced is that interest rates and exchange rates
are both driven by the deterioration in investors’confidence during the crisis. The
latter increases risk premiums and, consequently, interest rates and, at the same
time, depresses the exchange rate. This would typically generate a negative corre-
lation rather than the positive correlation obtained here.
Proportion of Successful Cases with Banking Problems
A vulnerable banking and corporate sector raises the often-mentioned trade-off
between banking sector fragility and exchange rate stability that a policymaker faces
when choosing a monetary policy. The policymaker may be less willing to raise the
Table 3. Unconditional Probabilities 
Versus Conditional Probabilities of Success
Probability 
Probability Conditional on 
Undervaluation1 Unconditional Conditional  on  Non-Tight  Significance 
(percent)P robability Tight Policy Policy Test2
15 0.31 0.44 0.27
20 0.32 0.50 0.26 *
25 0.30 0.55 0.22 *
30 0.25 0.57 0.17 *
35 0.23 1.00 0.15 *
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Success is defined as 50 percent of reversal achieved through nominal appreciation. 
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Figure 4. Probability of Success with Tight and Non-Tight Monetary Policies
Source: Authors’ calculations.interest rate to defend the currency when the banking and/or corporate sectors are
exposed to the interest rate increases.11 This is compounded by the fact that interest
rate increases may affect an investor’s expected return. Interest rates may affect the
probability of default by increasing the debt-servicing burden of the corporations, by
depressing the economy and reducing profits, by altering the net worth of corpora-
tions adversely exposed to interest rate changes, or, finally, by affecting the health of
the banking system, which naturally tends to be exposed to interest rate changes.12
In fact, we find that policymakers choose tight policies approximately as often
when they are simultaneously facing a banking crisis. In Table 4, we show that the
unconditional probability of choosing a tight monetary policy is similar to the
probability of choosing a tight monetary policy conditional on having a banking
crisis at different thresholds. 
Moreover, when tight monetary policy is adopted, the probability of a suc-
cessful recovery increases, but not significantly. (See Table 5 and Figure 5.) An
important caveat, though, is that for larger thresholds of undervaluation, our data
may not be representative, since the number of twin-crises cases with tight mone-
tary policy is very small. 
IV. Macroeconomic Variables Under Tight 
and Non-Tight Monetary Policy 
Even if one accepts that tight monetary policy helps to stabilize the exchange rate,one
also needs to take into account the costs involved in raising interest rates and weigh
them against the benefits. Therefore, a natural sequence for this study is to look at the
effect of tight monetary policy on output growth, inflation, and debt service.
In this section, we analyze the behavior of the growth rate of output, inflation,
the current account (as a percentage of GDP), and debt servicing (as a percentage
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11Other factors affecting the choice of monetary policy may include the stock of government debt and
the increased burden of debt servicing. 
12Ideally, one would like to analyze the effects of the health of the banking sector as well as of the cor-
porate sector on the reversal process and on the relationship between the real interest rate and the real exchange
rate. Because of the data limitations, however, we analyze just the effect of the health of the banking sector.
Table 4. Unconditional Versus Conditional Probabilities 
of Choosing Tight Policy1
Undervaluation Unconditional Probability Conditional 


























































Figure 5. Probability of Success Under Twin Crises with Tight and Non-Tight Monetary Policies
Source: Authors’ calculations.of GDP) in currency crises under tight and non-tight monetary policies. Given the
unavailability of higher-frequency data, this exercise is conducted using annual
data. Following the methodology developed in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
(1994), we first calculate the average value of the variable during the tranquil peri-
ods. Tranquil periods include all the years in the sample period, 1980–98, except
for the years of undervaluation. Then we take the deviation of the variable from
the average value during a few years around the time of undervaluation. A positive
value in any of these years indicates that the value of the variable is higher during
that year than the average of the tranquil periods. We distinguish between the cases
with tight monetary policy (TMP cases) and those with non-tight monetary policy
(NTP cases) and compare the behavior of the variables.
For this exercise, data on GDP, the nominal exchange rate, the current account,
and inflation were obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
database. Data on debt servicing were obtained from the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance database, which measures the ratio of interest payments on
external debt to GNP.
Figures 6–9 depict the behavior of these variables of interest around the crisis
period. Each figure shows the behavior of the variable for the whole sample (the
broken line) and for the subsamples of tight monetary policy and non-tight mone-
tary policy. In the figures, we focus on the year preceding the undervaluation, c–1;
the year when it started, c; and the subsequent four years, c+1, ..., c+4.
Figure 6 shows that during the undervaluation periods, inflation starts out
higher than the average for the tranquil periods and then declines. Inflation is higher
in the tight monetary cases than in the non-tight monetary cases to begin with and
then declines more sharply. This is consistent with the result that tight monetary pol-
icy is more successful. Figure 7 shows that the current account balance in the tight
monetary cases is lower than the average before the undervaluation but improves
and becomes higher afterward. Moreover, it is more negative in tight monetary cases
before and during the year of the undervaluation but then improves to surpass and
stay above the level of non-tight cases. Figure 8 shows that during the periods of
undervaluations, the burden of debt servicing is higher than the average. Moreover,
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Table 5. Unconditional Probabilities Versus 
Conditional Probabilities of Success in Twin Crises1
Probability 
Probability Conditional on 
Undervaluation1 Unconditional Conditional  on  Non-Tight  Significance 
(percent)P robability Tight Policy Policy Test2
15 0.34 0.38 0.33
20 0.33 0.43 0.30
25 0.29 0.40 0.25
30 0.29 0.66 0.21
35 0.38 1.00 0.29
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Success is defined as 50 percent of reversal achieved through nominal appreciation.
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Figure 6. Inflation During and After Undervaluation
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and authors’ calculations.































































c-1 c c+1 c+2 c+3 c+4 Year
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     Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and authors' calculations.
     Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistically significant t-ratios (for differences in values for tight and non-tight 
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Figure 7. Current Account Balance During and After Undervaluation
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and authors’ calculations.















































     Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington), various issues; and authors' calculations.
     Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistically significant t-ratios (for differences in values for tight and 







Figure 8. Debt-Servicing Burden During and After Undervaluation
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington), various issues; and authors’ calculations.
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     Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and authors' calculations
     Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistically significant t-ratios (for differences in values for tight and non-tight 






Figure 9. Output Growth Rate During and After Undervaluation
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics database; and authors’ calculations.
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistically significant t-ratios (for differences in values for tight and non-tight monetary policy) at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.debt servicing is relatively higher for the tight monetary cases.13 Finally, Figure 9
shows the behavior of the growth rate of output. Here we find that during the under-
valuation periods, it is lower than the average. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that
the recovery of output is sharper in tight monetary cases than in non-tight cases.
This result may be attributed to the fact that tight monetary policies are usually asso-
ciated with more successful reversals and, therefore, with economies recovering
with relatively less inflation and more nominal appreciations. 
V. Panel Data Estimation and Limitations
The analysis has so far treated each currency crisis as a single event and has not
analyzed the time-series relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in
the aftermath of currency crises. To fill this gap, we further analyze the effective-
ness of monetary policy in correcting the undervaluation in RER estimating a
fixed-effects model using monthly panel data. We consider undervaluations
greater than 15 percent and, hence, consider 77 episodes of undervaluation for this
exercise. The panel data consist of time-series observations for cases of underval-
uation. Since the duration of undervaluation differed across cases, we estimated
the model with an unbalanced panel.
We estimated the model by regressing the deviation of the real exchange rate
from the equilibrium exchange rate, RER (which measures the extent of under-
valuation), on real interest rates, controlling for the case-specific fixed effects. The
model specification is given as
yit = α i + β xit + uit (4)
where y is the deviation of real exchange rate from equilibrium, subscript i refers
to the ith case, and subscript t to the time period. Notice that t is different across
cases. A constant term α is assumed to differ across cases. The real interest rate is
denoted by x, and u is the error term with mean zero and constant variance. 
Table 6 contains the main results from this regression exercise. The coeffi-
cient of the real interest rate is found to be positive and significant at the 99 per-
cent level of significance, which implies that high real interest rates help in
correcting undervaluation.
In light of the recent debate on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the
presence of a fragile banking sector, it would also be interesting to see how the lat-
ter affects the relationship between the RER and the interest rate. Hence we
include a dummy variable for banking crisis in the estimation model and also
interact it with the RER. The results are presented in the second and third columns
of Table 6. Interestingly, the results show that when there is a banking crisis the
RER is more undervalued, though not significantly so. Moreover, the use of an
interest rate policy in such cases may not yield the desired effect. The coefficient
on the interaction term is indeed negative, though significant only at 90 percent,
which implies that when the economy is also experiencing a banking crisis, higher
interest rates may result in more depreciation of the RER. 
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13We also examine the ratio of debt servicing to debt and find that it behaves similarly.The econometric analysis presented above, however, is subject to important
caveats owing to the endogeneity and sample-selection issues. It may be argued
that if the choice of monetary policy is endogenous to inflation and the real
exchange rate, then our results on the effectiveness of monetary policy would be
biased. For example, the government may have a reaction function whereby it
increases interest rates if inflation picks up. This kind of behavior would, how-
ever, only give a downward bias to our results, since it implies that there would
be more cases of high inflation (that is, more unsuccessful cases) associated with
high interest rates.14
Second, it may be argued that the analysis suffers from the omitted-variables
problem. It is possible that a third factor, for example loss of confidence among
foreign investors, may increase both interest rates and exchange rates. Thus we
may see high interest rates associated with more unsuccessful cases, but this need
not imply causality between the two variables. Truly we cannot say anything about
causality here, but as far as the direction of bias goes, the presence of such com-
mon factors would, if anything, provide a downward bias to our results.
Third, our analysis may also suffer from the sample-selection problem—that is,
we tend to exclude the cases where tough governments (and, hence, tight monetary
policy) are able to prevent crises. In this case, we should observe fewer cases of tight
monetary policy and fewer successes in our sample. This, again, will bias the results
encountered in the study. We do find, however, that about 30 percent of our cases
have tight monetary policy and that these cases are relatively more successful. 
Finally, tight monetary policy may be accompanied by a whole package of
reforms. It would be difficult to disentangle the effects of these reforms and those of
tight monetary policy in facilitating the reversal of exchange rate undervaluation.
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Table 6. Panel Data Regressions of Real Exchange Rate1
Coefficient2 Coefficient2 Coefficient2
Sample (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Interest rate 0.0554 0.056 0.077
(3.19)*** (3.25)*** (4.99)***
Banking crisis –0.893 –0.576
(–1.42) (–0.939)
Interest rate and
banking crisis  –0.0498
(–1.814)*
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Dependent variable is deviation of the real exchange rate from the equilibrium value, and the
independent variable is the real interest rate.
2***denotes t-ratios statistically significant at the 99 percent level; ** denotes significance at the
95 percent level; and * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.
14To  address the endogeneity issues, we estimate a model using only cross-section data, with 77
episodes of undervaluation, and use a central bank independence index as an instrument. The main results,
which are not reported here for the sake of brevity, remain unchanged. We would like to thank Aart Kraay
for the data and suggestions. VI. Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence relating to the debate about the effective-
ness of tight monetary policy in stabilizing exchange rates in the aftermath of cur-
rency crises. Although exogenous monetary policy variables are not available, at
least not for a large set of countries, and true causality claims cannot be offered,
the relationships encountered in this study provide food for thought. 
The study finds that in a large set of undervaluations in the aftermath of currency
crises, tight monetary policy substantially increases the probability of reversing
undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than through higher inflation.
When the country is also experiencing a banking crisis, however, the results are not
robust: depending on the specification, a tight monetary policy may reduce the prob-
ability of a reversal of currency undervaluation through currency appreciation.
The study also looks at the effects of tight monetary policy on inflation, the
current account balance, and output growth. It finds that inflation declines more
sharply in the cases with tight monetary policy. The current account improves after
the implementation of tight monetary policy and remains stronger than in the non-
tight monetary policy cases. Interestingly, the study also finds that the recovery of
output is steeper in the tight monetary policy cases than in non-tight monetary pol-
icy cases. This result may be attributed to the reforms undertaken along with tight
monetary policy or simply to the restoration of investors’ confidence brought
about by the nominal appreciation of the currency.
APPENDIXES
I. Countries in the Sample 
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Argentina Ethiopia Kenya Rwanda
Australia Finland Korea, Republic of Senegal
Austria France Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bahrain Gabon Malawi Singapore
Bangladesh Germany Malaysia South Africa
Belgium Ghana Mexico Spain
Bolivia Greece Morocco Sri Lanka
Brazil Guatemala Nepal Sweden
Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Switzerland
Burundi Honduras New Zealand Thailand
Cameroon Hong Kong SAR Nigeria Togo
Canada Hungary Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Central African Republic India Pakistan Tunisia
Chile Indonesia Papua New Guinea Turkey
Colombia Ireland Paraguay United Kingdom
Costa Rica Israel Peru United States
Denmark Italy Philippines Uruguay
Ecuador Jamaica Poland Venezuela
Egypt Japan Portugal Zambia
El Salvador Jordan Romania  ZimbabweII. Chi-Square Test Concerning Differences Among Proportions
To test the null hypothesis θ 1 = θ 2, if xs are observed values of a set of independent random vari-
ables having joint binomial distributions with the respective parameters ni and θ i; and the ns are
sufficiently large, we can approximate the distribution of the independent random variables zi as
with standard normal distributions and 
as a value of a random variable having the chi-square distribution with k–1 degrees of freedom.
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